“Ensuring safe passage to public transportation for residents, visitors, travelers and workers. Providing directions and general assistance as needed. Reporting criminal or disruptive behavior to the SFPD and MTA Alerting 311 and city departments of safety hazards or street cleanliness/maintenance issues that affect public safety or health. Providing information and referrals on existing city programs and services as needed.”
I don’t know how long you’ll be able to watch this one – all the action is in the first part and then it just goes on and on. (“Aagh, I can’t breathe!” “Get off of him!” ”Aagh, I can’t breathe!” “Get off of him!”)
Not sure if the shoplifter had an actual iPhone. Seems as if he had, at the very least, some kind product endorsed by Dr. Dre, anyway:
And, indeed, those can retail for up to $350, so one of the security guards got that part right. As far as everything else though, there’s just too much to inventory – this is like a video on how not to detain a shoplifter. (Should you let go of the perp temporarily to show off the booty to sway the crowd? Probably not. I could go on, but, as always, You Make The Call.)
It ended up requiring the attention of both the SFPD and the SFFD. (I wonder if there’s an official report or two on this incident.)
Anyway, the “horse nazis” from Alpha and Omega are back, the SFPD is all over the place, and the perimeter fencing has been pushed out to cover an unprecedented area.
So maybe you’re best off trying to bum a ticket, as these poor souls were trying to do:
The new security setup allows the SFPD to go out riding fences with ease this year:
The good entrances are 33rd and Lincoln in the Sunset on the south side and 30th and Fulton in the Richmond on the north side.
But Fell and Stanyan, what some people consider the “entrance” to GGP, is far, far away from where you want to be. You gotta realize you are seeing a concert that’s way out in the West Bay.
And people, don’t take the 5 Fulton from San Francisco to get there. C’mon! Use your noodle. Try the #38 Geary or the #31 Balboa and then hoof it south at 30th, if you want.
But what’s this, the everyday price for a can of black beans is less than a dollar? Quelle surprise!
Now, here’s a scene you’ll just have to get used to: an aging, go-to-hell Volvo blocking a new Toyota Prius on Stanyan while waiting to get into the lot:
But three parking lot attendants (seems a bit overstaffed but whatever) and a uniformed security guard seemed to have things under control when I dropped by.
(Shoplifters will have a tougher time practicing their craft at this super as compared to the predecessor, one might guess)
I don’t know, you might find this fresh report from the RAND Corporation about leadership dynamics in Islamic Republic of Iran worthy of attention.
Anyway, the price is right – it’s a free .pdf so take a gander, if you want.
Here’s the intro:
Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads
An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics
By: David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, Frederic Wehrey
The Islamic Republic of Iran poses serious challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East, and its nuclear program continues to worry the international community. The presidential election of June 2009 that returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power and led to broad protests and a government crackdown presents yet another cause for U.S. concern. Yet the U.S. ability to “read” the Iranian regime and formulate appropriate policies has been handicapped by both a lack of access to the country and the opacity of decisionmaking in Tehran. To help analysts better understand the Iranian political system, the authors describe
Iranian strategic culture, including the perceptions that drive state behavior
the informal networks, formal government institutions, and personalities that influence decisionmaking in the Islamic Republic
the impact of elite behavior on Iranian policy formulation and execution
factionalism, emerging fissures within the current regime, and other key trends.
The authors observe that it is the combination of key personalities, networks based on a number of commonalities, and institutions—not any one of these elements alone—that defines the complex political system of the Islamic Republic. Factional competition and informal, back-channel maneuvering trump the formal processes for policymaking. The Supreme Leader retains the most power, but he is not omnipotent in the highly dynamic landscape of Iranian power politics. The evolving role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the vulnerability of the elite “old guard” to challenge, and the succession of the next Supreme Leader are key determinants of Iran’s future direction. In light of complexities in the Iranian system, U.S. policymakers should avoid trying to leverage the domestic politics of Iran and instead accept the need to deal with the government of the day as it stands. Moreover, they must take as an article of faith that dealing with Iran does not necessarily mean dealing with a unitary actor due to the competing power centers in the Islamic Republic.
